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OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (---ETC F/8 15/7
REVIEW OF THE GUARD AND RESERVE (ROGAR), A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION---ETC(U)
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
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REVIEW^c OF THE GUARD AND RESERVE

A FRAMEWORK
FOR ACTION

ODASD(RA)
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE
(RESERVE AFFAIRS)



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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

26 DEC 1979

MANPOWER,
RESERVE AFFAIRS
AND LOGISTICS

MEMORANDUM FOR Assistant Secretary of Defense (MRA&L)

Subject: Review of Guard and Reserve (ROGAR)

I am pleased to submit this summary of the extensive study of the roles, missions, manning, equipping and training of our National Guard and Reserve Forces. This summary is based on a study which was prepared under the leadership of Major General Francis R. Gerard, Air National Guard.

Though, of course, in a report of this magnitude many individual observations and judgments are debatable, I think you will agree that the Study as a whole makes a real contribution by enhancing our understanding of the Reserve Forces. I am encouraged, moreover, by the interest shown within the Department to address issues on their merits during the development of the Defense program and budget.

Clearly, as the Report suggests, we have substantial problems to address in order to attain the level of effectiveness and readiness in the Reserve to which we in OSD aspire. But these are soluble problems. Already, in the course of the Study, some of the problems have been addressed with success. I am confident that, using this Report as a frame of reference, we can meet our problems and achieve the goal of a truly ready Reserve.

Harold W. Chase

Harold W. Chase
Deputy Assistant Secretary
(Reserve Affairs)

Attachment



MANPOWER,
RESERVE AFFAIRS
AND LOGISTICS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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SUBJECT: Review of the Guard and Reserve (ROGAR),
A Framework for Action.

I am pleased to release this summary of the extensive study of the roles, missions, manning, equipping, and training of our National Guard and Reserve Forces. Numerous measures were identified in the Review of the Guard and Reserve (ROGAR) that will enhance national security by improving the mobilization readiness of these forces. Although I do not necessarily agree with all parts of this Report, I am in full agreement with its theme and objectives.

As we strive for increased capability and greater efficiency in the 1980's, further emphasis will be placed on the readiness, deployability and war-fighting ability of our Guard and Reserve. History has borne out the foresight of the founding fathers in safeguarding the Nation by placing heavy reliance on citizen responsibility. This reliance is expressed today in the form of dedicated service in the National Guard and Reserve Forces. I am confident Guardsmen and Reservists will continue to respond positively to the obligations imposed upon them.

12/48

Robert B. Pirie, Jr.

Robert B. Pirie, Jr.
Assistant Secretary of Defense (MRA&L)

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Our Nation continues to depend for its defense upon our Reserve forces. Under the total force concept, Reserve forces would perform critical missions in any future conflict. My administration is committed to ensuring that these vital forces are fully manned, well trained, well equipped and capable of rapid mobilization and integration into the active force in time of national emergency.

JIMMY CARTER

Overview

INCREASED RELIANCE ON RESERVE FORCES

DEFENSE POSTURE

The US defense posture of the 1980's will emphasize increased reliance on the Reserve Forces (RF). The viability of this posture depends upon the Nation's ability and willingness to support the required number of Reserve Component units and individuals. Reserve units must be manned, equipped, and trained properly and be capable of mobilizing and employing rapidly in time of need. Reservists who are not members of units must be trained properly and able to report to the right place at the right time after Mobilization Day (M-Day).

TRADITIONAL MILITARY POLICY

Reliance on Reserve Forces continues the "common defense" militia concept which has existed from pre-Revolutionary War times. A democratic nation is protected best by a minimum level of standing armed forces which can be augmented promptly in time of crisis by trained citizen-soldiers.

The most demanding requirement placed on RF is the ability to participate in a major conventional war in Europe that begins with little or no warning and is of such high intensity that many RF must be capable of deployment and employment within the first 30 days.

A timely RF mobilization in this situation hopefully would contribute to deterring the Warsaw Pact from launching an attack. Failing this, RF would help stabilize the front and repel the invader. If the Soviets prevail in the opening battle of a European conflict, RF would be necessary to continue conventional operations against the aggressor. A nuclear attack against the Continental United States would require employment of RF to maintain order and assist in alleviating the effects of the attack.

ONE HAND WASHES THE OTHER

Our active duty forces are not configured to wage war without a mobilization of RF. One-half of the Nation's combat power and two-thirds of its support capability are maintained in the RF. A major conventional war would necessitate mobilization of RF to augment the Active Forces.

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The Pact advantage in the first few days after they mobilize can be reduced only by strengthening in-place forces, by speeding NATO's own decision to mobilize, and by increasing the rate of mobilization of the reserves of Allied nations.

HAROLD BROWN
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

"Readiness Now" is the best insurance
for the security of our country.

General David C. Jones, USAF
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

THE CHALLENGE

The Challenge. Although NATO and the Warsaw Pact are roughly comparable in Military personnel and forces, the WP has the advantage of having its European forces based in or near the areas of potential conflict. A substantial portion of NATO strength, however, is outside of Europe on M-Day, primarily in the United States and Canada.

The key element of the ability of NATO to react to a major non-nuclear attack by the Warsaw Pact with little or no warning is the ability to move large numbers of military forces from North America to Europe in the early days of the crisis. Many of the forces that must move rapidly to Europe starting at M-Day are in the National Guard and Reserve Forces of the United States. The most urgent priority is to assure the survivability of our forces in West Europe in the event of a WP attack.

"COME AS YOU ARE"

THE RESPONSE

The US response to this challenge must be "come as you are" employment of Active and Reserve Forces. There will be little or no time available for post-mobilization manning, equipping, and training of the RF.

To counter the increased capability of the Soviets to launch a short-notice attack, our RF must be brought to an unprecedented level of peacetime readiness.

RF scheduled for early deployment must attain a peacetime readiness that enables them to be moved to Europe promptly and to perform their mission upon arrival in-theater.

RF whose mission is to man the support base must attain a peacetime readiness status that enables them to mobilize instantly to support forward-stationed and deploying US forces in Europe.

These requirements thrust responsibilities of unprecedented magnitude on the RF. The rapidity of mobilization expected of the RF in the 1980's is more demanding than that expected of the Active Forces in the 1960's. By the mid 1980's all RF will be scheduled for employment or deployment in the first four months after M-Day. In order to contribute directly and immediately to stopping and containing an initial attack, priority will be given to maximizing the readiness of forces — Active and Reserve — to be committed in the first 30 days.

PRESENT CAPABILITY OF RESERVE FORCES



RC Ground Forces are achieving increased readiness through newly authorized programs but manpower shortfalls are continuing and critical in nature



RC Naval Force surface elements meet wartime requirements but indecision concerning future force structure is debilitating



RC air arms achieve high readiness ratings and maintain a 72 hour mobilization and deployment capability



Coast Guard Reserve is capable of performing its early response mobilization mission

("Capability" refers to general efficiency and ability in "as is" state; is not an indicator of potential ability)

**HOW READY
ARE THE RESERVES?**

MEETING THESE RESPONSIBILITIES

Guard and Reserve units are in a better state of readiness than most people believe but some are not as ready as we would like them to be.

There are numerous acceptable ways to measure unit readiness; the key is to interpret and use the gathered data properly. The current rating system presents a conservative estimate of the capability of Army Guard and Reserve units. The professional judgment of senior unit commanders of the Army Guard and Reserve is that the present capabilities of the Selected Reserve are significantly higher than the current popular literature and conventional wisdom imply.

**SITUATION MAY
DEMAND RF DEPLOY
"WHEN NEEDED" NOT
"WHEN READY"**

Many RF units demonstrate professionalism and quick-response capability during Annual Training, mobilization exercises, operational readiness inspections, and in fulfillment of state public protection or emergency missions. However, urgent and immediate attention must be given to improvement of the readiness posture of most RF units to provide a high degree of assurance that the demanding mobilization employment requirements can be met. Many units classified as "not ready" could be deployed when needed and contribute to the war effort although their contribution would be less than their design output.

RESERVE FORCES
SELECTED RESERVE UNITS
 (personnel strength, 000s)

-End FY 80-

	Wartime Manning Goals	Peacetime* Manning Goals	Actual Strength Sep 79	Actual Strength As Percent of	
				Wartime Goal	Peacetime Goal
Army National Guard	436.4	403.3	345.5	79.2%	85.7%
Army Reserve	276.0	260.0	190.0	68.8	73.1
Naval Reserve	102.0	87.0	88.3	86.6	101.5
Marine Corps Reserve	43.9	33.0	33.3	75.9	100.9
Air National Guard	100.0	92.1	93.4	93.4	101.4
Air Force Reserve	59.5	53.9	56.7	95.3	105.2
U.S. Coast Guard Reserve	<u>15.5</u>	<u>11.7</u>	<u>11.7</u>	<u>75.5</u>	<u>100.0</u>
Totals	1,033.3	941.0	818.9		
Less Sep 79 Strength		818.9			
SHORTFALL		122.1			

*Peacetime manning goals represent Congressional authorizations except in the Army Reserve Components (ARC). ARC peacetime goals represent DoD readiness objectives.

"The most critical single challenge to sustaining
 forces in combat is our inability to assure adequate
 Reserve Forces manpower."

General Bernard W. Rogers
 Chief of Staff, US Army
 November 27, 1978

Major Problem Areas and Initial Program Objectives

MAJOR PROBLEMS

There are major problems with the RF which currently preclude many RF units from meeting their required employment schedules. In order for the RF to constitute a credible portion of our overall defense posture these problems must be solved.

Strength

Manpower shortfalls currently prevent many Army National Guard and Army Reserve units from achieving the state of readiness necessary to meet mobilization and deployment schedules. The initial program objective is to raise RF strengths to peacetime objectives which are over 90% of wartime strengths.

Equipment

Equipment for the RF is better than ever before in terms of both quantity and quality. However, the required readiness can not be achieved until each Reserve unit has at least an initial issue of all the equipment authorized for wartime. This equipment need not be the latest model, but it must be combat serviceable. The initial program objective is to assure initial wartime equipment for each unit.

Training

Training is improving in the RF but it is still not good enough. There continue to be too many administrative distractions and regulatory constraints. Training time is scarce for Reserve units. Each unit should train toward its wartime mission, and the best way to do this is to perform similar actual work in peacetime. Participation in large-scale exercises with Active forces provides excellent training in command and control and other military skills. The initial program objective is to maximize effective use of available training time.

Mobilization Responsiveness

Additional resources can improve manpower and equipment levels and training readiness, but there are other factors inhibiting mobilization preparedness that must be overcome. Among these is the need to have a management structure conducive to mobilization. Adequate planning for mobilization is contingent upon existence of a management structure which permits rapid transition from peace to war. The initial program objective is to establish a management structure which will facilitate rapid mobilization and deployment of Active and Reserve Forces.

ALLOCATION OF DEFENSE DOLLARS

<u>Military Programs</u>	<u>Constant FY 1980 Dollars</u> <u>Total Obligational Authority</u>		
	<u>FY 1978</u>	<u>FY 1979</u>	<u>FY 1980</u>
Strategic Forces	10.3	9.1	10.8
General Purpose Forces	47.8	50.3	50.0
Intelligence and Communications	8.9	8.6	9.1
Airlift and Sealift	1.8	1.9	1.9
→ GUARD AND RESERVE FORCES*	7.8	7.4	7.1
* Research and Development	11.5	11.8	11.8
* Central Supply and Maintenance	13.5	13.7	13.8
* Training, Medical, Other General Personnel Activities	27.3	27.5	27.9
Administration and Associated Activities	2.5	2.5	2.6
Support of Other Nations (Excluding MAP)	<u>.3</u>	<u>.4</u>	<u>.6</u>
TOTAL	131.8	133.2	135.5
Portion of TOTAL Defense budget allocated to Reserve Forces	5.91%	5.55%	5.24%

GUARD AND RESERVE FORCES is one of the 10 major Defense Planning and Programming categories. Measured in terms of Constant FY 80 dollars, the Guard and Reserve budget has declined in real terms.

*Guard and Reserve Forces are also supported by these Major Programs

RF Program Trends

Since inception of the Total Force Policy there has been a significant increase in the level of financial support of the Reserve Forces. Defense planning in the 1970's has provided for increases in POMCUS and airlift capability; both of these decisions also reflect a strong commitment to reliance on the Reserve Forces. However, the recent decline in budgetary support is a major limiting factor in preventing RF from reaching their desired level of combat readiness. While all other Defense Planning and Programming categories have been permitted a modest growth, the RF budget has been declining for the past two years when measured in terms of constant FY 80 dollars. This reduction runs counter to the expanding role the RF have been given in our contingency plans.

Pretrained Individual Manpower

Modern warfare demands that pretrained manpower be available in numbers never visualized in the past. Pretrained manpower must be available in sufficient quantity to bring Active and Reserve units to wartime strengths and to replace initial combat losses. Pretrained manpower will be the only useable manpower available until a wartime draft can produce inductees and military training centers can turn untrained inductees into a trained, disciplined fighting force.

PRINCIPAL SOURCE: IRR

The principal source of individual pretrained manpower is the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The long-range objective of the Defense Department is for each Service to maintain an IRR of adequate size to meet that Service's need.

IRR SUPPLEMENTS

Programs to increase IRR strength have been instituted or proposed but they can not provide adequate numbers to bring the IRR to the desired level until 1985 or later. The Defense Department must plan to use IRR supplements for those Services whose IRR cannot fully satisfy the pretrained individual manpower demand. These IRR supplements are:


Retired Personnel

— Retired Personnel. These personnel are legally available for involuntary recall in a full mobilization. Retired personnel can serve at training centers, support bases and in other positions where experience is more valuable than youth. The Defense Department program involves identifying appropriate wartime positions and identifying retired personnel having skills to fill those positions. Retired personnel so identified will be pre-assigned to appropriate jobs.

Standby Reserve

— The Standby Reserve. The timely availability of Standby Reservists (member who have been excused from training or who have fulfilled their training obligation) is reduced significantly by the statutory requirement that this category of Reservists be processed by the Selected Service System before being recalled.

ARMY SELECTED RESERVE STRENGTH TRENDS



SERVICE SITUATIONS

The match between the supply and demand for IRR personnel varies considerably among the services.

- The Marine Corps has sufficient IRR personnel to meet their stated demands.
- The Air Force would have to use all of its IRR and call back substantial numbers of retired personnel.
- The Navy would have to use all of its IRR and large numbers of retired personnel. Improved management of the Navy's IRR and retired personnel is required to assure availability on the dates needed.
- The Army has a serious shortage of pretrained individual manpower. Indications are that a shortfall of over 200,000 could be experienced.

A large portion of the demand for pretrained individual manpower consists of personnel needed to bring units from peacetime to wartime strength upon mobilization. This deliberate undermanning of the active forces may be justified in peacetime from an economics standpoint. However, the small dollar savings produced by undermanning of Reserve forces may not be justifiable in view of the risk involved.

RELATIONSHIP TO SELECTED RESERVE STRENGTH


Each individual person assigned to a Selected Reserve unit reduces the requirement for filler personnel upon mobilization. It is much more effective and only slightly more costly to place these fillers in Selected Reserve units in peacetime rather than holding them in the IRR until wartime. Manning Selected Reserve units at their wartime strengths in peacetime helps solve the pretrained individual manpower problem and improves the ability of the Reserve units to meet the demanding deployment schedules of the 1980s.

LONG-TERM SOLUTION

If efforts to bring the IRR up to its strength with current manpower policies do not succeed, it may be necessary to resort to additional actions. Some additional ways to increase IRR strength are as follows:

- Increase the Military Service Obligation to eight years.
- Draft personnel directly into the IRR.

ARMY MANPOWER ASSETS (000's)



Army Mobilization Manpower

RF UNITS ARE 130,000 UNDERSTRENGTH

Army mobilization manpower goals currently are not being met:

- strength of the Army Selected Reserve (units of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve) is 130,000 below peacetime objectives.
- strength of the Army Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) (non-unit Reservists) is insufficient to meet Mobilization Day requirements for pretrained individual manpower.

SELECTED RESERVE STRENGTH INCREASES

As the result of actions taken during 1978, the strength of the Army Selected Reserve is increasing in 1979. Enlistment and reenlistment bonuses, a three year term of initial enlistment, and more convenient initial training options and a larger, trained recruiting force have increased the numbers of volunteers for the Selected Reserve. Increasing efforts to retain those who join are expected to bring about further strength increases.

IRR STRENGTH INCREASES

IRR strength also is increasing as a result of management actions taken during 1979. The primary reason for the large increase is the stopping of the transfer of personnel to the Standby Reserve for their sixth year of military service obligation. Intensive efforts are underway to continue the IRR strength increase. Initiatives being proposed or implemented are:

- A reenlistment bonus for the IRR.
- Shorter initial enlistments for active and Selected Reserve volunteers.
- Direct enlistment into the IRR (test now underway).
- Improved counseling of personnel leaving active duty.

IRR MANAGEMENT

Attention to strength problems also requires proper management of existing assets. Improved management of the IRR involves:

- preassignment of IRR and retired personnel needed in the first month to specific jobs or military installations.
- positive career management of IRR personnel
- mandatory peacetime refresher training for IRR personnel needed early in mobilization; voluntary training for other IRR and retired personnel.

These management actions will provide a high degree of assurance that personnel would report promptly to the proper place and with the proper skills.

One means of measuring ground forces combat power is to count the number of maneuver battalions in the force. In the 1980 Army, the Reserve Forces will provide 52.8% of the maneuver battalions.

52.8%



RF Battalions

Army Force Structure

TOTAL ARMY ANALYSIS

The Army force structure for deploying forces is determined through the Total Army Analysis (TAA) process. A statement of the time-phased requirement for major combat units necessary to accomplish the national strategy is provided to the Army by OSD.

Utilizing the time-phasing of the combat unit requirement as the driver, TAA determines the combat support and combat service support unit requirement in theater, over time, for the given scenarios. Analysis of these time-phased requirements assists in determining which units can be placed in the Reserve Forces and which units must be maintained in the Active Force.

When units become obsolete, through mission or doctrine changes and/or weapons or support systems modernization, the TAA process modifies the force structure accordingly.

BASE OPERATIONS SUPPORT WOULD BE INADEQUATE AT MOBILIZATION

In addition to the overseas deployed forces, the Army must have a CONUS sustaining base. The sustaining base includes the garrison, training, medical, logistical, and other support forces required to mobilize, train, deploy, and sustain the deployed elements. The Army force structure design process does not analytically identify the CONUS sustaining base requirements.

There are indications that this sustaining base is inadequate to support full mobilization, both from the standpoint of personnel and facilities. Action has been initiated to identify these requirements through employment of a Mobilization Requirement Model (MOBREM). Full incorporation of this model within the TAA process will more accurately identify total mobilization requirements.

**Mobilization Requirements are
Dependent Upon Missions Assigned,
Not on Funding-Level Decisions**

Mobilization

A STRATEGY OF READINESS

Mobilization and deployment to participate in a major conventional war in Europe must be executed in a timely and professional manner. Swift, efficient mobilization in time of international crisis could persuade a potential aggressor to refrain from military action. A confused and chaotic mobilization could court disaster.

Past US mobilization can generally be characterized as transition from peace to war on a trial and error basis. Although new wars bring different demands, history clearly indicates the need for systematic and integrated mobilization planning. Realistic and workable mobilization plans must be prepared in advance of mobilization and evaluated on a continuing basis and updated as required.

Gaining Command Program

The Army has established a Gaining Command Program (GCP) that provides for direct communication and coordination between early-deploying RF units and the overseas or CONUS headquarters they would serve under initially in wartime. Early-deploying RF units in the GCP program will perform annual training in the overseas theater every third year.

The Navy has improved the readiness of RF by a Gaining Command Program that places operational control and readiness responsibilities of Reserve functional units with the Navy commands responsible for the Active force counterparts.

The Air Force implemented a highly successful Gaining Command Program several years ago. Gaining commands establish training standards, conduct inspections, and monitor the activities of RF units. The Gaining Command Program has permitted an efficient and streamlined RF command structure.

Mobility

Mobilization for a major conventional war will strain the nation's rail and truck capacity to move RF personnel and equipment to mobilization stations or ports while moving Active Force personnel and equipment for deployment to Europe. Joint planning in peacetime is necessary to minimize the conflicting transportation demands that will occur on M-Day. Other factors that must be considered are:

- the necessity to move the millions of tons of resupply requirements and
- the increased tempo of civilian transportation activities that occurs as the industrial base is expanded.

CONTRIBUTION OF RESERVE COMPONENT UNITS TO TOTAL FORCE

30% DIVISION FORCES
72% SEPARATE BRIGADES/REGIMENTS
67% LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

Army Guard & Reserve

32% TACTICAL FIGHTERS
50% STRATEGIC AIRLIFT CAPABILITIES
60% AIR DEFENSE ASSETS
64% TACTICAL AIRLIFT ASSETS
21% AIR REFUELING ASSETS

Air Guard & Reserve

Navy Reserve

20% TACTICAL/MOBILITY FORCES
10% SUPPORT FORCES
15% AUXILIARY FORCES

Marine Corps Reserve

25% DIVISIONS
25% AIRCRAFT WINGS
25% SERVICE SUPPORT FORCES

One-half of the Nation's combat power and two-thirds
of its support capability are maintained in the RF

Deployment

Deployment of reinforcements to Europe must be timely. The objective is to have the capability by 1983 to double US ground combat forces and triple US tactical air squadrons in Europe in about 10 days. Rapid reinforcement in time of crisis might well serve to deter an attack. Should hostilities commence before our Europe-deployed forces are reinforced, our airlift and sealift forces will be further taxed as the Soviets inflict losses on men and materiel in transit.

Mobility forces—airlift and sealift—currently do not provide sufficient personnel and cargo capability to meet early-deployment needs. This problem is being addressed by

- increased pre-positioning of equipment in Europe. Equipment for a three-division corps force will be added to the current POMCUS (pre-positioned materiel configured to unit sets).
- commitment of commercial aircraft and ships by NATO countries for the movement of US troops and supplies.
- improving US airlift and sealift capability

PRINCIPAL RESERVE FORCES (COMBAT, COMBAT SUPPORT, COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT)

COMBAT DIVISIONS

8: Armored, Mechanized Infantry, Infantry

ROUND OUT UNITS TO ACTIVE ARMY DIVISIONS

4 Brigades: Mechanized Infantry, Infantry

11 Separate Battalions: Armor, Mechanized
Infantry, Infantry

SEPARATE COMBAT BRIGADES

24 Brigades: Armored, Mechanized Infantry,
Infantry

OTHER BRIGADES & COMMANDS

8 Engineer

6 Military Police

3 Transportation

1 Air Defense

2 Signal

2 Corps Arty HQ's

4 Special Forces Groups

12 Training Divisions

1 Theater Army Area Command

4 Corps Support Commands

12 Hospital/Hospital Centers/Med Bdes

**Army
Guard & Reserve**

FIGHTER/ATTACK WING EQUIVALENTS

3½ A-7s

2 A-37s

3 F-4s

2 F-105s

1½ F-100s

1 AC-130

SUPPORT SQUADRONS

1 E-C 130 Squadrons

8 RF-4 Reconnaissance Squadrons

6 Tac Air Control Squadrons

1 SOF Squadrons

6 O-2 Forward Air Controller Squadrons

TACTICAL AIRLIFT

29 C-130 Tac Airlift Squadrons

4 C-123 Tac Airlift Squadrons

3 C-7 Tac Airlift Squadrons

STRATEGIC SUPPORT/AIR-TO-AIR REFUELING

16 KC 135 Tanker Squadrons

11 Air Defense Squadrons

**Air
Guard & Reserve**

Navy Reserve

SURFACE COMBATANTS/SUPPORT SHIPS

28 Destroyers

22 Mine Warfare Ships

3 Amphibious Warfare Ships

6 Fleet Support Ships

AIR

2 Attack Carrier Air Wings

2 Patrol Wings

1 Helicopter Wing

1 Tactical Support Wing

1 CONSTRUCTION BRIGADE

Marine Corps Reserve

1 Marine Corps Division

1 Marine Corps Air Wing

"Our Reservists have long been a bulwark in our country's defense, and whenever freedom has been challenged, they have served — in partnership with our active forces — with great distinction."

John F. Kennedy

Sustainability

WE MUST OUTLAST AS WELL AS OUTFIGHT THE ENEMY

If hostilities commence, we must be prepared to OUTFIGHT the Warsaw Pact in the initial battle. We must also be prepared to OUTLAST the Warsaw Pact by promptly reinforcing and sustaining our committed forces.


To OUTFIGHT the WP in the initial battle, near-term readiness is being enhanced. Because lift capability is limited, movement of support troops to the theater in the early stages of conflict must be held to the minimum essential.

To OUTLAST the WP we must build the capability to sustain our forces in a war of extended duration. By displaying the staying power to wage a war of extended duration we can negotiate peace from a position of strength.

Under the NATO Long Term Defense Program individual members have pledged to improve sustainability of forces by such measures as building up war reserve stocks and improving operational readiness of certain Reserve units. It is imperative that by example we encourage other NATO members to achieve that degree of sustainability necessary to outlast the Warsaw Pact.

The sustainability (staying power) of our NATO-committed forces must be sufficient to meet the WP threat. If we lack sustainability on the conventional battlefield we could face the unsatisfactory alternatives of either (1) early introduction of nuclear weapons or (2) termination of the conflict on a relatively unfavorable basis.

In a Warsaw Pact confrontation, personnel in US based Active Force Army divisions will be airlifted to Europe and will "marry up" with combat equipment and spare parts prepositioned in the Theater.



Some mobilized National Guard divisions will be stationed at installations which housed early-deploying Active divisions. These mobilized units could "fall in" on equipment left behind by early-deploying divisions.

POMCUS

NATO's conventional defenses are being strengthened by prepositioning more US Army equipment in Europe. In carrying out this improvement in forward deployed support capability, care must be exercised to minimize the adverse effect of withdrawal of equipment for Active and Reserve units. The level of equipment available in Active and Reserve units must not fall below the minimum needed for training.

When an Active division with prepositioned equipment deploys to Europe, plans must be developed for safeguarding and redistributing of equipment left behind. Allocation to mobilized Reserve units of left-behind equipment should be in accordance with mission priorities.

Host Nation Support

Host Nation Support agreements are being concluded which provide that Allies will furnish certain logistical support to US forces in NATO. HNS is a powerful and effective means of rationalizing the combat effectiveness of an Alliance; properly applied HNS can maximize the combat power of the NATO Alliance through time.

HNS agreements will cause changes to be made within the US force structure; these changes entail long lead times and must be carefully planned and coordinated.

In addition to pre-planned HNS support mentioned above, US forces must be able to deal effectively with all levels of friendly governments on whose territory they are operating in wartime. This is a suitable mission for RF units. RF units should be designated for early deployment to coordinate HNS activities and otherwise deal with friendly governments that have US forces operating in their territory.

In no other profession are the
penalties for employing untrained
personnel so appalling or so
irrevocable as in the military.

Douglas MacArthur

Training

TRAINING TIME IS LIMITED

The major constraint in training Reserve Forces is the limited time available. To the extent possible, training in Reserve units is decentralized and performance-oriented and emphasizes ability to accomplish the wartime mission. Because premobilization training time is limited, most units would require post-mobilization training to achieve maximum effectiveness.

Members of Selected Reserve units attend 48 training assemblies and two weeks of annual training each year. Each training assembly is of 4 hours duration. It is common practice for units to meet one weekend per month by combining 4 training assemblies. Mobilization readiness needs cannot be met by conducting less than 48 training assemblies per year.

HIGHER TRAINING REQUIREMENTS MEAN LOWER CASUALTY RATES

Successful job performance and survivability on the battlefield may require that individuals in the most demanding skills receive peacetime training beyond the 48 assemblies per year.

High readiness ratings have been achieved by units in which personnel are authorized more than 48 training assemblies per year.

Authorization of additional training assemblies (ATA) would reduce or eliminate post-mobilization training and thus permit employment of mobilized Reserve Forces in the early, critical days of a major conflict.


The use of full-time training/readiness personnel schooled in training management and methods helps achieve maximum benefit from the limited training time available to Reserve Forces.

DASD-RA has launched a Training Management Study. Its purpose will be to examine Reserve Component training and current training management and provide recommendations which will ensure training management throughout DoD is appropriately organized and operates in an efficient manner so as to contribute to combat effectiveness.

STUDIES OF THE NAVY SELECTED RESERVE PROGRAM

	<u>Date</u>	<u>Conducted By</u>	<u>Selected Reserve Strength Recommended</u>
Surface Reserve Study	1972	Navy	117,000
Total Force	1973-74	OSD	92,000
OP-605	1974-75	Navy	102,000
Navy Mission Study	1976-77	OSD	95,000
Navy Manpower Mobilization System	1978-79	OSD/Navy	?

NAVY MANPOWER ASSETS FY 1980



**STRENGTH OBJECTIVES
AND
AUTHORIZATION
REQUESTS SHOULD BE
BASED ON VALIDATED
REQUIREMENTS**


The demands of a NATO scenario require commitment of Navy Reserve manpower and materiel resources

- to provide the surge capability to effect prompt and sustained combat operations at sea, and*
- to ensure adequate protection of sea lines of communication and commerce.*

The importance of a Navy Reserve trained and ready to augment the Regular Navy was demonstrated in January 1968 when a limited mobilization of the Selected Reserve was undertaken following the USS PUEBLO incident. Although wartime manpower requirements have decreased significantly during the 1970's (primarily due to decreases in the numbers of ships and aircraft) available manpower has declined even more sharply.

The Navy Selected Reserve program has undergone three major reorganizations since 1972 with authorized strength dropping from 129,000 (FY 72) to 87,000. While manpower programs and policies must be responsive to changing requirements, a degree of stability is necessary to meet overall strength objectives and maintain individual proficiency.

MARINE CORPS SELECTED RESERVE



Marine Corps

The Marine Corps Selected Reserve is organized into a Fourth Division Wing Team (DWT). The Selected Marine Corps Reserve may be employed by units to either augment and/or reinforce the active forces by individuals, units or as a Division Wing Team with a wartime strength requirement of 46,720. This wartime requirement will be met with Selected Reserve personnel, 90% of the active personnel assigned to the 4th DWT, and IRR fillers.

The programmed peacetime strength of the 4th DWT is 33,600 of which 29,900 are mobilizable Selected Reserve personnel. Upon activation the 4th DWT would include the Selected Reservists plus 4,020 active duty personnel and would require augmentation of approximately 12,800 personnel from the IRR. The mix of Selected Reserve units and Individual Ready Reserve personnel should be determined by placing individuals in the category (unit or IRR) providing the amount of peacetime training necessary to meet required mobilization and employment/deployment schedules.

Unit readiness would be enhanced by increasing the peacetime strength of the DWT. An increase of peacetime strength to 35,500 would cost \$2,500,000 annually. Equipment deficiencies in Marine Corps funded items are programmed to be satisfied by FY 84. Additional equipment deficiencies exist in Navy funded items.

F-106



KC-135



A-7



The Air Reserve Forces consist of units and individuals with the following mission capabilities

- deter nuclear attack
- support nuclear retaliatory forces if deterrence fails
- provide fighter/attack and reconnaissance forces to counter known threats and contingencies
- provide air defense through interceptor forces
- provide airlift support to all the Military Services

Air Reserve Forces

ARF MEET SAME CRITERIA AS ACTIVE FORCES

The viability of the Total Force Policy is illustrated by the mission-ready status of the Air Reserve Forces (ARF). Operational Readiness Inspections using the same standards as are applied in evaluating Active Air Force units confirm the operational-readiness of the Air National Guard (ANG) and the Air Force Reserve (AFRES).

ARF PERFORM VITAL PEACETIME MISSIONS

The ARF provide a major share of Air Defense of the North American continent by maintaining interceptors and crews on an around-the-clock, peacetime alert status. The capability to refuel Strategic Air Command (SAC) bombers enroute to target areas is met by maintaining ARF aerial refueling tankers on a 24 hour, peacetime alert status. The ARF also have a contingent of fighters on alert status and a rotational C-130 squadron in the Canal Zone.

In the event of a European conflict, prompt mobilization and deployment of tactical fighters, both Reserve and Active, would be essential to reduce the numerical advantage enjoyed by the Warsaw Pact in terms of tactical aircraft currently in Europe.


KC 10: A WIDE-BODIED AIRCRAFT THAT CAN REFUEL AIRCRAFT IN-AIR AND/OR TRANSPORT CARGO

To conduct an inter-theater movement of these tactical fighters would require air-to-air refueling. To meet this and other aerial refueling requirements that would arise during a crisis requires the modernization of the tanker force. This can be accomplished by the KC-135 reengining program and the acquisition of KC-10A tanker/cargo aircraft.

ASSOCIATE PROGRAM OFFERS ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES

AFRES units using Active Air Force equipment in an Associate Program perform needed peacetime missions as a by-product of training. Under the Associate Program the number of aircrews exceed the number of aircraft; this permits an increased aircraft utilization rate. The KC-10A Associate program enhances the Air Force lift/refueling capability by supplying personnel needed to meet wartime surge requirements.

TANKER MISSION



Maintaining tactical fighter planes and trained manpower in the Air Reserve Forces is only part of the Readiness equation. KC-10As and reengined KC-135s are needed to provide air-to-air refueling of planes being flown to the combat theater in time of crisis.

Simultaneous modernization of the ARF and the Active Air Force should be carried out as a natural implementation of the Total Force Policy. Some A-10 and F-16 fighter aircraft are scheduled to go directly into the ARF from production lines. Some AFRES units will fly the new KC-10A advanced tanker/cargo aircraft under an Associate Program with SAC.

The ARF have achieved the capability to mobilize and deploy within 72 hours. Their success is in large part due to the full time force (approximately 25% of the ARF), and the ability of the technicians to fill the dual role of conducting unit operations on a day-to-day basis and training part-time Reservists on drill weekends. Congressional limitations have precluded the ARF from employing the number of full time technicians deemed necessary to attain maximum unit readiness.

Although some ARF units lack modern equipment they provide valuable personnel resources and unit integrity that should be retained in anticipation of receipt of modern equipment. The preservation of units having only marginal equipment is a sound practice as such units can make an effective contribution in time of crisis.

Training of the ARF is demanding and time consuming; requirements and standards are similar to those imposed on the Active Force. Currently the ARF are able to complete most of the ground and flight requirements through diligent use of 48 training assemblies, two weeks annual training, and 36 Additional Flying Training Periods. This is deemed the minimal training time needed to maintain proficiency. Wartime response capability would be degraded if lesser time were devoted to training.

Training and readiness of tactical Air Reserve Forces is hampered by airspace limitations imposed by the Federal Aviation Administration. Current procedures placing responsibility at the wing or unit level for developing training routes and maneuver areas puts an undue administrative burden on the wing/unit. A centrally-directed program for airspace management would alleviate this burden.

Coast Guard
SELECTED RESERVE UNIT TRAINING FORCE STRUCTURE

Port Security Units	158
General Support Units	53
Rescue Coordination Center Units	8
Vessel Augmentation Units	12
Aviation Units	3
Mobilization Administration Units	9
<u>Inspection Units</u>	<u>5</u>
TOTAL	248
Inter-service Training Units	18

Coast Guard Reserve

In wartime the role of the Coast Guard is expanded and the mobilized Coast Guard Reserve (CGR) joins the active Coast Guard in providing for the defense and internal security of water ports through which military personnel, equipment, and munitions must pass to meet the demands of a rapid (RF) mobilization.

The Coast Guard Reserve is comprised of 248 units organized into 60 groups. The majority (158) of these units are port security units and the bulk of them train with the same command they will augment in wartime. Some CGR forces will be deployed overseas to perform such missions as (1) air search and rescue and (2) explosive loading advisory teams.

The programmed peacetime strength of the Selected CGR is 11,700; the early response wartime requirement is approximately 22,000. To meet the wartime requirement would require the mobilization of slightly more than 10,000 members of the Coast Guard's Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The IRR is presently capable of providing the numbers needed upon mobilization.

Plans to increase the number of personnel serving in units to 15,500 by FY 91 will provide for 100% fill of all officer and petty officer billets required in the M to M+30 period. This increase in Selected Reserve strength from 11,700 to 15,500 can be obtained for approximately \$5.7 million per year.

A one-time expenditure of approximately \$.5 million would provide all small arms needed to meet present mobilization requirements.

NATIONAL GUARD STATE MISSIONS

CY	Number of Call Ups	Total Troops
78	298 (24 States)	32,363
77	229 (9 States)	19,494
76	166 (7 States)	10,567
75	223 (17 States)	20,068
74	195 (21 States)	36,253

Emergency Callups—1978

1. Civil Disorder

Type	Number of Times Called
Prison Disorders	1
Possible Civil Disturbance	2
Civil Disturbance	4
Employee Strikes	15
Support Law Enforcement	2
	<u>24</u>

2. Natural Disasters

Type	
Snowstorms	36
Cold Weather	10
Forest Fires	18
Floods	47
Tornados	13
	<u>124</u>

3. Other Emergencies

Type	
Water Hauls (Water Shortage)	30
Search and Rescue	44
Security and Traffic Control	4
Medical Evacuation	32
Power Outage	5
Train Derailment	7
Chemical Spills	2
Fires (Others)	3
Support Missions	23
	<u>150</u>

“(The militia) is certainly an object of primary importance, whether viewed in reference to the national security, to the satisfaction of the community, or to the preservation of order.”

George Washington

Public Protection

MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITY

PUBLIC PROTECTION

Military Support to Civil Authority is a military mission of the National Guard, performed in a State Status, authorized and directed by the Governor of the State within the applicable provisions of State laws, to provide emergency assistance to state and local government.

The public protection role involves the commitment of organized units that are manned, equipped and trained to protect life and property, and to preserve peace, order and public safety.

Following a tradition that is based on the US Constitution, Public Protection activities are generally assigned to the National Guard. Other Reserve Components may be used to provide military support to civil authority only at the specific direction of the President and only after all local resources have been exhausted, or in the enforcement of law.

During Calendar Year 1978, Governors called up 32,363 National Guard troops for a total of 290,000 days of service in connection with 298 separate incidents of civil disturbances, national disasters, and other emergencies.

The National Guard command and control structure has proven adequate to perform both its Federal and State mission.

COAST GUARD RESERVE

The Coast Guard Reserve has a statutory responsibility to support the Active Coast Guard during domestic emergencies. During Calendar Year 1978, the Coast Guard Reserve performed 171,500 days of service in connection with domestic emergencies.

"By making it universally reputable to bear Arms and disgraceful to decline having a share in the performance of Military duties, by keeping up in Peace a well regulated and disciplined Militia, we shall take the fairest and best method to preserve for a long time to come, the happiness, dignity and Independence of our Country."

George Washington

Domestic Action/Community Relations

IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF LIFE

**"Ask not what your
country can do for you —
ask what you can do for
your country"**

DOMESTIC ACTION/COMMUNITY RELATIONS


Reserve Forces are encouraged to participate in construction of parks, providing health care and training to needy children, youth camps for disadvantaged children, parades, patriotic assemblies, and informing the public of Reserve Force contributions to national security objectives

When the service performed is related to military training requirements, personnel may serve in a military status; when the service performed is not related to military training requirements, personnel must serve in a volunteer status.

Membership in the Reserve Forces is de facto service to the Nation. The often-times voluntary donation of the Reservist's time and energy to building a better America through Domestic Action/Community Relations activities is evidence of the deep and strong commitment of the Reservist to the Nation.


Domestic Action/Community Relations activities project a positive image of Reserve Force service and are considered beneficial to recruiting and retaining Reservists.

THE DEFENSE DOLLAR



8c to Reserve Forces

THE BUDGET DOLLAR



**24c TO NATIONAL DEFENSE
OF WHICH 2c IS FOR
RESERVE FORCES**

R&D costs are not distributed between Active and Reserve Forces.

Peacetime Support to Active Force

RESERVE FORCES SUPPORT THE TOTAL FORCE

The Reserve Forces make an important contribution to the Total Force by supporting the Active Force in peacetime. These activities increase individual proficiency, offer team building and collective training, and otherwise improve mobilization readiness. The work performed contributes to the day-to-day defense effort and provides for a meaningful partnership between the Active and the Reserve Forces.

SPECIALIZED SUPPORT

Unique services provided include:

- translation of foreign language documents
- topographic support
- Engineer construction/maintenance/repair
- Command & General Staff college instruction
- Weather reconnaissance flights

Reserve Forces flying units support Strategic Air Command, air-to-air refueling, and participate in Strategic Air Command alerts. RF flying units move thousands of passengers and thousands of tons of cargo annually in support of the Active Forces.

MEDICAL SUPPORT

Reserve Forces medical personnel routinely provide support at Active medical facilities.

- Following the Guyana tragedy, AFRES provided medical personnel, air-to-air refueling services, and airlift of medical supplies.
- Aero-medical evacuation in support of Active Force requirements

MAINTENANCE SUPPORT

Maintenance support by the Reserve includes:

- ARNG & USAR maintenance units contribute to maintenance support in Europe during OCONUS training
- Combat service support units perform Annual Training at Depots, thereby reducing Depot workload backlogs.
- Aviation depot level maintenance repair of Intensive Managed Items

TRAINING SUPPORT

Reserve Forces provide support and training to Active Forces and to ROTC units.

- Base Operations, equipment and maintenance support is provided to Active Forces training at State-operated (National Guard) installations
- winter warfare training, desert training



I have but one lamp by which my feet are guided and that is the lamp
of experience. I know no way of judging of the future but by the past.

Patrick Henry

**CITIZEN-SOLDIER
POLICY HAS SERVED
THE NATION FOR TWO
HUNDRED YEARS**

The history of this country from colonial days to the present has shown that the Nation's safety is best preserved by reliance on citizen responsibility expressed in the form of sizeable National Guard and Reserve Forces.

Past wars found many Guard and Reserve units undermanned, underequipped, and ill-prepared for speedy mobilization. This lack of readiness inevitably slowed prosecution of the war but we were afforded the luxury of time to build up and train our forces. This luxury would not be available to us in the event of a Warsaw Pact surprise attack.

READINESS NOW

With or without assistance of satellite states, the Soviets have the capability of invading Western Europe with little warning. Should such an attack occur the United States and its allies would rely on prompt commitment of Reserve Forces to assist in the defense of Western Europe. This requirement for *Guard and Reserve units to arrive in the European Theater within days after an outbreak of hostilities* necessitates a policy of "Readiness Now" for Reserve Forces.

LOW-COST STRATEGY

The national military strategy of increased reliance on Reserve Forces is a relatively low-cost strategy—the cost of an Army Selected Reservist being about one-fifth the cost of an active duty soldier. Expressed in constant dollars, allocation of funds to the Guard and Reserve has declined about 10% from FY 78 to FY 80. This decline must be halted and a moderate additional investment made to assure the Reserve Forces are capable to perform their role in the national military strategy.